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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
DOROTHY STEVENSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 9529

vs.
VERNON L. STEVENSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STA'TEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an acti'on for divorce on the groun'd:s
of mental cruelty.
DISPOSTTION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court found that plaintiff failed 'to
prove mental crueTty and den1ied her a divorce.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the judgment of the trial court.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
'The parties to this action will be referred to
as they appeared in the Tri'al Court. Since the Statement of Facts as presented in the Appellant's Brief,
alludes to and presents that testimony which is
most favorable to her position, and because the case;
·is equi taJble 'in nature and the Court has the power
to review the evidence 'and weigh the s·ame, there
follows a statement and discussion of pertinent
testimony necessary to complete a review of the
evidence 'in the case.
1

Following a three day trial, the District Court
denied plaintiff's prayer for relief in her suit
against her husband for a divorce on lhe grounds
of mental cruelty.
The plaintiff ·and defendant became acquainted
in 1934 while the defendant was completing his
'internship as a medical doctor at the Sacred Heart
·Hospital in Spokane, Washington. Shortly after,
Dr. Stevenson began 'the practice of medicine in the
small community of Garfield, approxim·ately 50
miles from Spokane. Marriage followe'd in January
of 19'35. (R. 25, 117). During the approximately
four years in which the parties lived and worked
in this small community, Dr. Stevenson described
their relationsHip a·s follows:
"I think to me this was a wonderful
m·arri'age. I know how I felt, and I felt·dur2
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ing those years, and I am sure Mrs. Stevenson felt they were wonderful years." ( R. 117)
Both worked hard and in mutual understanding
and confidence until sufficient money had been obtained to make a down payment on a home in a
larger city. They moved to 8'alt L'ake City in '1939
('R. 118). The plaintiff alleges that their marriage
was fraught with difficulties from the second night
of their marriage. The defendant acknowledges that
some small problems have arisen durlng their married lives, prior to approxim'ately two years before
the date of the tri~al, which he characterized
as minor. Mrs. Stevenson alleged that Dr. Stevenson has repeatedly suggested divorce during the
course of their marriage. His answer to this charge
,is conVincing.
"I wouldn't be here in this courtroom
:today if I had, (suggested divorce) and if
I had 'any ide'a of obtaining a divorce, that
is what I am figh'ting to preserve. No't only
this marriage but this family." (R. 118)
In her brief, the plain tiff makes reference to
various "menial servi'Ces" which she alleges the defendant required of her. She complains that she
had the "responsibility" of cle'aning his pipe (Appellant's Brief, P. 3). However, her own testimony
refutes the existence of any element of compulsion.
She did it "because my father smoked a pipe and I
knew how, and anything you know how to do, I
3
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guess you do it." (R. 36). She complained that she
was "required to pack his sui tease" and make it
ready for his use when· they left on trips. Certainly
this is a matter of mutual effort and common cooperation extended within a family for the purpose
:of accommodating the busy schedule which the doctor was maintaining. The spirit of cooperation is
further demonstrated by the fact that Mrs. Stevenson purchased the doctor's .clothes, which she liked
to do ( R. 105 A) . !The long and la:te hours which
the doctor was required to work ·to build and maintain his practice were frankly admitted by him as
being a source of regret in his life. Even so, Mrs.
Stevenson now charges as an element of mental
cruelty that she screened telephone calls for the
doctor late at night, although at the time such was
her '''express desire" to give her husband an opportunity to rest after he had been working late. At
the time she did not resent doing it (T. 1'48). The
~defendant considered his rel~ationship with his wife
a partnership in whlich both shared responsibility
and mutually enjoyed the benefits (R. 150).
During the war years, Dr. Stevenson served
in the Navy. While he was in the Continental United
States, prior to his leaving for service overseas,
Mrs. Stevenson with their two children voluntarily
accompanied him from one assignment to another
(R. 120). During this time Dr. Stevenson recalled:
'''I think we enjoyed the closeness during
4
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t~ose first few months. It was the opportune

time to get together and the hours at the Navy
base didn't compare with private practice."
(R. 119)
While the family was in the service they had
more time together and considered their inconveniences a "family project" (R. 119-1'20). Following
the war years Dr. Stevenson has taken his wife on
an annual trip to Mexico, with fishing at Mazatlan
and excursions to other parts of the Unites States,
including Washington, D. C., Chieago, New Orleans,
and the entire Northwest for the purpose of visiting
Mrs. Stevenson's parents (T. 1'20). A close relationship developed between 'the plain tiff's family 'and
their own, which was encouraged and appreciated
by the doctor ( R. 120) .
The plaintiff suggests in her Brief (P. 4), that
while she was suffering from !a hernia ted disc,
proper medi:cal 'attention was not given to her. However, she admi'ts that she, with Dr. Stevenson, went
to Omaha to consult Dr. Keeting, one of the best
neurological surgeons in America, who did a complete neurological survey of her condition ( R. 38,
105).
The plaintiff characterized her perform'ance
of the common wifely duties in the home as a valet
service ( R. 38) , and yet the record s'tands unrefuted that until approximately two years before the
trial the family was characterized by love and 'af5
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fection for each other (R. 123). Until then the
family enjoyed happy and wonderful Christmases
together. Just three years before, Mrs. Stevenson
'bought a movie camera for the doctor and stated
"we are going to give you 'a gift for once that is
appropriate ( T. 12'3).
'Plaintiff points to the fact that she maintained
the swimming pool as an evidence of 'the mental
cruelty which the defendant inflicted upon her (R.
40). Dr. Stevenson explained that the construction
of the pool was one of the first projects of the family.
It was given to Mrs. Stevenson as 'a birthday gift
-in 19'54 (R. 28-121). Plaintiff enjoyed swimming
almost daily and was of '"championship caliber."
She was not compelled to clean the pool as she now
suggests, but supervised it out of interest and was
happy in doing it ( R. 122). As the children grew
up, they too enjoyed the pool wi'th their friends and
the family (R. 122).
The extent of family cooperation which characterized the Stevenson home is demonstrated by
the interest displayed by 'Mrs. Stevenson in assuming the responsi:bility of preparing and filing the
tax returns for the family. She also took care of
the office records when other assistance was not
available. Dr. Stevenson indicated:
"This seemed to be 'a mutual effort until
we could afford someone to do it for us. She
came down to the office and 'did the work
6
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when anyone was sick. She would fill in at
any point."
The doctor indica ted that in this respect she
had done "a bang-up job for us" (R. 118).
The plaintiff now complains about the necessity of performing menial tasks around the home
and yard, but the record is undisputed that after
the family moved to Salt Lake City, a gardener
and a cleaning woman were available to assist Mrs.
Stevenson in m'ain taining the home. There were
times when Mrs. Stevenson declined assistance (R.
122). Further, the home was equippe'd wfth ~ade
quate appliances to lighten the responsibility of
maintaining the home and to preserve her time
and health (R. 122). Even so, plaintiff suggests
that failure to supply the most modern applitances
is a form of mental cruelty.
An issue was made of the fact that Mrs. Stevenson brought lunch to her husband at his office because he was too busy to take a lunch hour, (Appellan·fs Brief, P. 4) although she ~admits that such was
'·'part of the routine of the house" (R. 44). It would
seem unreasonable to find the extension of a common courtesy of this type between a husband and
wife constituted mental cruelty.
The plaintiff also begrudges having assisted
her husband with legislation relative to the State
Medical Council and complains that she missed a
7
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bridge party because of it (R. 45). However, her
interest in political matters was sufficient to manage Representative Dawson's political campaign at
one time ( R. 105) . She is presently a National
Committeewoman, and Dr. Stevenson has consistently supported her in that endeavor, and he characterized their mutual effort in this respect as a
'''good team" (T. 125).
~until approximately three years prior to the
date o'f 'trial, the parties exhibited sufficient mutual
confidence in each other to maintain checking and
savings 'accounts. All purchases of stocks, bonds and
insurance were in their joint names. They went fishing, camping and boating together and enjoyed a
happy and close family life ( R. t25).
With reference to the ;change in attitude of
Mrs. Stevenson, the doctor testified:
"It was a change from a wonderful setup to a vexatious one, which changed and it
was a sudden change, it was evident first to
me three ye'ars ago, this month, on our trip
to Mazatalan, Mexico. 'That was the first cognizant feeling I had. 'There had been an abrupt
change from a wonderful person, and anyone
in this community knows that when we are
out with friends." ( R. 126)
'It is not surprising that Dr. Stevenson searched
diligently to find the source of the difficulty which
was breaking his married life and home. He indica ted that suddenly he met open antagonism from
8
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his wife, and that communication between them
broke down (R. 127-129). She no longer wished to
go out with the doctor to the hospital at his invitation, while he Was making his rounds. She didn't
want to do 'anything they ordinarily had done. 'Their
friends and association with the various clubs to
which they belonged suffered because of a lack of
it (T. 1'27). Dr. Stevenson observed that she was
:losing weight and suggested they consult a doctor
concerning it. She didn't accept the suggestion kindly, hut retorted:
"I need no medical care, I won't receive
any." (T. 128).
The doctor indicated that for the first time in
her life she became ''aggressive".
The doctor was convinced that his wife ·could
be assisted medically and he made every effort to
make medical care available to her ( T. 115) .
He was convinced that divorce was not an answer to the problem (T. 1'20, 141).
Plaintiff notified the doctor of her intention
to leave him by leaving a note under his pollow,
which he discovered after returning from taking
her to the train. She was going to visit their daughter who was attending school in California. It simply
stated, "I don't love you, I have left ... " (T. 1'28).
The love and concern the doctor had for his
wife is demonstrated most convincingly by his con9
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duct. As soon as he found the note from his wife
jndicating that she was le'aving their home, he and
their son drove through the night to Los Angeles
to discuss the matter with Mrs. Stevenson and to
find a solution to their problem. In an attempt to
reconcile their differences, Dr. Stevenson expressed
his desire to make concessions and to conform to
more of her desires (T. 147). He tried to be more
attentive and on repeated occasions pled with her:
"Let's do something, let's get some help,
see what we can do for this partnership 'and
this family" (T. 150) .
In an attempt to relieve her burdens in the
household, he and the children gathered the dishes
and he answered every telephone call at night. Even
so, Mrs. Stevenson moved her sleeping quarters into
another room, which further aggravated the situation.
The plaintiff 'attempts to impute mental cruelty
from the defendant's suggestions that she consult
psychiatrists for a "mental problem". His concern
was for her well being and that of their home and
family. The doctor considered the problem with his
wife was primarily an "emotion'al" one (T. 151).
'The doctor testified that in his opinion he had
been at fault in the marriage in devoting too much
time to the profession and there was a lack of
'''emotional communication" (R. 153). As indicated
10
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in Exhibit P-1, the defendant wrote a note to his
wife wherein he stated, "I asked God's forgiveness
for not being a good husband." Plaintiff points to
this as indication that Dr. Stevenson was responsible
for the marital breakup. However, on cross-eX'amination when asked what he meant by these words,
Dr. Stevenson stated:
"It means a lot - at that time it is an
emotional impact that is characteristic of an
individual . . . * * * I meant tha;t at the
time this was a breakup of love and a family,
I was sorry for it. That was the intent, I was
sorry for it." (R. 155)
Certainly this indicates the willingness of the
doctor to meet the situation more than half way in
·an attempt to find a solution to the problem which
is plaguing his home. This attitude is consistent
with reconciliation as opposed to the attitude of
his wife as demonstrated in the following colloquy
between the wife and counsel on cross-examination.
Question : ~ The whole fault was on the part
of your husband?
Answer: I think so, I have tried to be a good
wife." (R. 239, 167)
The Stevenson family before this marital 'difficulty arose lived in much the same manner as
any other family of a successful professional man.
They enjoyed a swimming pool together ('R. 121,
122), went on trips to Mexico and visited the plain..
1

41

11
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tiff's parents in the State of Washington with whom
the defendant and the children had a fine relationship. They worked together in politics (R. 125),
and as a team in his profession ( R. 118). The defendant testified that the first evidence of plaintiff's
change of attitude toward him occurred three years
before the trial on March 1, 1961, while the parties
were on a trip to Mazatlan, Mexico (R. 126-148,
149). Because of this sudden change in their relationship after twenty-five years of happy married
life, the defendant felt the difficulty stemmed from
the fact that plaintiff was suffering from an emotional problem caused 'by the onset of the menopause
or ''·change of life", in the words of laymen, which
had been aggravated by his failure to recognize the
situation earlier and devote more time to her and
less to his practice (R. 129 and 130). (She was
forty -seven years of age.) He urged that both of
them seek help (R. 129). The plaintiff saw Dr.
Hardin Branch once for an examination to determine if she was paranoid ( R. 34). The defendant
·saw him once for fifteen minutes (R. 130). Subsequently in compliance with a promise made to her
son, Vernon Jr. she consulted with Dr. William
Brown, a psychologist engaged in marriage counseling, for ·a total of 24 hours. The defendant also
counseled with Dr. Brown for a total of 14 hours
'(R. 130). Dr. Brown informed the defendant that
1'2
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in counseling with the plaintiff he said, "I have
met a point of resistance; I cannot break this barrier. It is a deeper barrier than superficial and a
barrier I cannot break" ( R. 131), that he had suggested hypnosis but the plaintiff would not consent
(R. 131). The defendant felt the plaintiff shoul'd
continue with the counseling and in a conference
with Dr. Brown it was agreed that an attempt
would be made to persuade the plaintiff to continue
with the counseling by enlisting the help of their
daughter, M'arjorie (R. 133). At the trial, Dr.
'Brown, testifying on behalf of the plaintiff, denied
the need for further counseling but admitted on
cross-examination that he may have used the word
"barrier" in conversation with the defendant, and
he had suggested hypnosis, which plaintiff refused.
(R. 89 and 90).
Plaintiff was later referred by Dr. Hardin
Branch to Dr. Ijan Korner for a psychological evaluation. Dr. Korner's report on the results of the tests
was introduced in evidence as Exhibit P-7. He saw
the plaintiff three times. On the last two appointments she was given some psychological tests (R.
169). He concluded that she was not mentally ill
and that she was not an individual who at the time
he tested her should be considered in the common
sense of the word "neurotic". But he note'd that
she had an unwillingness to communicate about her
13
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own feelings which appeared to be of long standing, that she was a person who had been for a long,
long time unable to talk to others about her feelings
or thoughts, that she did not permit even herself
to know what she felt, that she was terrorized by
the imagined power of her husband and agonized
by her decision to oppose his powers, that there was
some evidence that this situation resembled earlier
pre-adolescent experiences in her life. She was quite
frightened. She was in terror of the situation which
was related to her extreme hostilities which were
unexpressed an'd well repressed. She was afraid of
her hostility and in her fantasies suffered all of
the discomforts of retaliation (P. 7). Dr. Korner
admitted there is a gray area 'between normalcy
and a:bnormalcy ( R. 172) , that most people during
their lives cross into the gray area and return. As
stated in his report (P. 7) he testified on crossexamination that her feelings had been repressed
for a long period of time ·( R. 182) . In answer to a
question from the Court he said the adverse reaction
of plaintiff toward defendant because of her repression could have been building up for years without defendant's being aware of what was happening ( R. 191) . In accordance with an order of the
court both parties obtained 12 hours of consultation
immediately before the trial. Defendant saw Dr.
James Simmons, staff psychiatrist at the N euro14
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psychiatric Institute located at the University of
California Medical Center in Los Angeles. His report was introduced into evidence as Exhibit D-4.
The plaintiff saw Dr. Craig Nelson, a psychiatrist
practicing in 'Salt Lake City. 'His report is in troduce dinto evidence as Exhibit P-3. On cross-examinati'on Dr. Nelson said there were neurotic factors
which played a part in the pl:aintiff's decision to
terminate the marriage (R. 2'12), but contended
that despite these "neurologic :factors" her de'cision
was rational. In answer to questions from the Court
Dr. Nelson said it was possible that the plaintiff
could have unreasonable fears about the defendant's
authority and yet be classed 'as a healthy person.
Unreasonable fears were defined as not being founded on reality. This could be attributed to a childhood
condition; further, that the defen'dant could live
with the plaintiff for years without knowing that
the problem was developing. (R. 213, 214).
STATEMEN'T OF POTN'TS
POINT I.
THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT NO. 4, IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT THEREOF.
'POINT II.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT IS SUPPORTE'D
BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS NOT CONTRARY TO
THE WEIGHT THEREOF, NOR IS IT AGAlNST TH'E
LAW.

15
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ARGUMENT

The alleged error of the trial court i's set out
in two separate points by the appellant, and are
argued as one. Similarly, respondent will answer
the arguments of the appellant in the same manner.
While it is true that the Supreme Court in equity
cases may review and weigh the evidence, the exercise of this power is not without limitation. In the
case of Doe vs. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 Pac. 781 ; the
scope of review by the Supreme Court was defined
a:s follows:
''While we, on appeal, may approve, modify, or annul, them (findings) yet when specifie Findings are made on material issues, respecting which the evidence is in conflict, we,
because of the trial court's better opportunity
to test the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of their testimony, generally approve
such findings ; unle'Ss on the record it is shown,
and we are persuaded, that the finding is so
. clearly against the weight of evidence as to
show error.''
In the 1956 case of Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah
2d. 79, 296 P.2d 977, the trial court granted the
plaintiff a divorce but awarded substantially all
of the property of the parties to the defendant. On
appeal by the defendant the court again acknowledged its right to review and weigh the evidence of
the case, but set out the re'Striction of this authority
as follows:
16
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"The more recent pronouncements of this
Court and the policies to which we adhere,
are to the effect that the trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion in such matters, and his judgment should not be changed
lightly, and in fact, not at all, unless it worked
such a manife'St unjustice or inequity as to
indicate a clear abuse of discretion."
The same principle was announced in slightly
different language in the case of McDonald v. McDonald, 236 P.2d 1066, 120 !Utah 573:
''We adhere to the qualifications set forth
in the more recent expressions of this court:
That the judgment will not be distributed unless the evidence clearly prepon'dera tes against
the findings of the trial :court; where there has
been a plain abuse of discretion or where a
manifest injustice or inequity is wrought."
See 'also, Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104,
138 P.2d 252; Allen v. Allen 109 Utah 99, 165 P.2d
872, Graziano v. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 3'21 P.2d
931, to the same effect.
'The appellant devotes ·22 pages of his brief to
a review of the facts of the case in an attempt to
show that over the period of twenty-seven ye'ars,
during which the parties have been married, that
acts of unkindness have occurred for which the defendant is deemed responsible. So meticulous was
the plaintiff in her review of these difficulties that
she rehearses in detail for the public record ·some
minor incidents, one of which she alleges occurred
17
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the second night of their marriage in 1935. With
calculated care she rehearsed the problems which
arose during their wedded life and which for at
least 24 years the parties had overlooked and maintained a home of stability in the community and
raised a family to 'adulthood. Many of the events
which were testified to by the plaintiff were not
remembered by the defendant. Not out of crassness
nor non-concern for the feelings of the plaintiff
nor "distainfully" as suggested in her brief at page
12, but because these matters were inconsequental
when viewed in the setting of a married life which
spanned a period of twenty-seven years. Under
examination by the Court the plaintiff testified
that she didn't have any faults which brought on
the divorce ( R. 167). The trial court was not willing
to believe that all the difficulties which arose during
their long marriage were chargeable to the defendant. As suggested in the cases cited above, the trial
court had the advantage of observing the demeanor
of the witnesses and weighing the testimony. Mter
so observing them and listening to the testimony
of all witnesses the trial court was convinced that
a ground of divorce based on mental cruelty, did
not exist. There is nothing in the record which indicates that this judgment was a ~'plain abuse of
discretion", or that ''''a manifest injustice or inequity" was wrought by reason of the court's decision.
18
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Considerable space in appellant's brief is devoted to a review of textual material on the subject
of Marriage and Divorce, (pages 24-27 inclusive)
wherein the writer discusses the proposition that
physical 'brutality is not neces·sary to establish
grounds for divorce on the ground of mental ·cruelty.
Certainly, authority beyond the expressions of our
own ~ourt need not be consulted to establish this.
As a matter of fact, the legislature has specified
mental cruelty as 'a ground for divorce. Although
the term is somewhat uncertain in meaning our
courts have given it sufficient interpretation to
permit equitable application. In the case of Curry
v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P.2d 939, the court
observed that:
"There, of course, must be some objective
standards upon which to judge whether mental cruelty is made out. But it must also be
realized that what constitutes cruelty to the
extent of causing great mental distress has
considerable subjective content because it depends somewhat upon the sensabilities of the
person complaining, and also in a measure
upon the justification, or lack of it, for the
conduct complained of."
In this connection the wisdom of the previous
expre'Ssions of this court concerning the "discretion"
vested in the trial court is plainly manifest. Whether
or not the alleged act of the defendant constitutes
mental cruelty must be, to a great extent, subjectively applied to the case under consideration. ·The trial
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judge has an opportunity to observe the "sensibilities of the person complaining" and to measure the
justification or lack of it for the conduct of which
complaint is made, 'and upon this basis to determine
whether or not the elements of mental cruelty exist.
In the instant case it is difficult to conceive how
acts which occurred 27 years before, many of which
were denied or not remembered by the defendant,
can now realistically constitute a basis of creating
great mental distress in the plaintiff. The gravamen of the plaintiff's testimony was to rehearse
for the benefit of the court, in an attempt to justify
the complaint which had been filed, all of the difficulties the parties had experienced in 27 years of
wedded life and for which the plaintiff in an am·azing display of self-righteousness attempts to lay
the entire responsibility at the feet of the defendant.
This case ha'S many similar aspects to that of
Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Utah 580, 245 P. '235 (1926).
There the plaintiff husband after having been married for 45 years brought suit for divorce against
his wife upon grounds of mental cruelty. He complained particularly that during the past five years
his wife had been of a "mean and cross disposition",
had persistently and habitually abused him by calling him vile and insulting names, had been of sullen
and cross disposition, had failed to give him recognition except to sneer at him, had manifested the
20
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greatest hatred toward him, told him repeatedly
that she despised him and that her life with him
had been nothing but hell, and that she would not
be sorry when she was done with him. As a consequence of defendant's hatred and treatment, the
plaintiff husband was compelled to leave home and
ever since his leaving had lived separate and apart
from her. He alleged that her hatred toward him
was so great that it was impossible for him to live
with her and that her conduct and treatment of him
had caused, great mental distress and suffering.
·The defendant generally denied the plaintiff's
allegations and counterclaims alleging adultery and
cruel treatment against her husband, upon which
grounds she prayed for divorce. The only issue presented on appeal was whether there was sufficient
grounds for divorce on the part of either party. After
enumerating the considerable problems of the parties
over the years, which included many cruel remarks
directed at each other, the court denied relief to
either party.
"Upon the whole record, we think there
is no substantial reason shown why the parties should be divorced from each other. It is
not enough that they both desire a divorce or
refuse to live with each other. Courts are not
authorized to grant divorces except on the
particular causes prescribed by law, and they
only when the grounds or cause for divorce is
21
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proved by substantial and satisfactory evtdence." (Emphasis added).
Language in appellant's brief is quoted from
the cases of Hendricks v. Hendricks, 12'3 Utah 178,
257 P."2d 366, Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296
P.2d 9'77, and from Graziano v. Graziano, 7 Utah
2d 187, 3'21 ·P.2d 93'1, in support of a suggested
proposition that in these situations where the marriage relationship has deteriorated to a point where
its continuance appears hopeless, that it is the responsibility of the court to grant a divorce and
terminate the legal relationship of husband and
wife. However, a review of those cases and subsequent pronouncements of the Supreme Court clearly
indicates that such is not the law in Utah, and the
cases cited do not support it.
In the Hendricks case the plaintiff sued and
the defendant counterclaimed for divorce. From a
judgment dismissing the action the plaintiff appealed. The court found that each party was guilty
of cruel treatment of the other and that grounds
existed but refused to grant a divorce to either, because each were considered to be equally at fault.
The parties were advanced in years having raised
a family and it was contended that the parties
would be happier if they were free to go their separate ways.
This Court recognized that it is seldom, per22
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haps never, that a wholly innocent party seeks a
divorce against one who is wholly guilty. Upon this
basis the Court stated:
'·'Our policy has been to take into consideration the practical exigencies of such situations, and in cases such as the instant one,
where both are at fiault, approved the granting
of divorce to the one least to blame."
It should be specifically noted that both parties
had been guilty of cruel treatment of the other and
either of them would have been entitled to a divorce
under different cir~cumstances. However, in the instant case, the trial ·court specifically found that the
plain tiff had not proved to its satis'faction that the
defendant has been guilty of cruel treatment. Further, the defendant is resisting and not seeking a
divorce. The Hendricks case is not precedent for the
granting of divorce in the instant case.
In Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah ·2d 79, 296 iP.'2d
97'7, the question of sufficiency of proof regarding
the grounds for divorce was not raised. The only
question that was considered wa:s the reasonableness
of the property settlement which the court made.
It is difficult to see how that case under any circumstances can be authority for the relief here
sought by this appellant.
In any event, the Supreme Court in the case of
Curry v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 3'21 P.2d 939, cor23
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rected any misunderstanding in this regard which
may have resulted from the earlier cases.
In the Curry case the plaintiff wife sued for
divorce which was met by 'a counterclaim of the
husband. The trial court awarded the husband a divorce on his counterclaim. It is to be noted that both
were seeking a divorce.
The Court recognized that the Wilson and Hendricks cases contained language to the effect that
public policy is best served in granting 'a divorce
"when it appears that the purposes of matrimony
had been destroyed to the extent that further living
together was intolerable, it was in accordance with
the ·court's duly and perogative to grant the plaintiff a divorce." Any comfort appellant may have
found in this language is quickly dispelled in the
following quotation from the Curry opinion:
"The gravaman of defendant's attack on
the judgment is that the trial judge ... misunderstood and misapplied the law in that he
thought that because the parties could not
get along, he ought to grant a divorce whether
the plain tiff had made out grounds or not.
It is true that Judge Wahlquist stated that
under 'the cases of Hendricks v. Hendricks
and Wilson v. Wilson, he thought he should
grant a divorce, but in both of those cases
there existed grounds for divorce, as is plainly indicated in the respective opinions, and
they cannot properly be tortured into holding
that a divorce should be granted where spouses
are unable to live harmoniously together,
24
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wh_ether grounds sufficient to meet the requ~rements of our statute are made out or not.
We do not think that the record supports defendant's contention tha:t the trial court so
misunderstood or applied the law. That on the
contrary, supports pl'aintiff's thesis that he
applied the rule which we recognize as correct: that there must exist grounds for divorce sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of our statute, which specify cruelty to the
extent of causing great mental distress."
While it is true, as recognized in the Curry
case, that the Court cannot remand the parties
"back into a state of reconciHation and happiness",
the language is clearly not susceptible to the meaning implied by the plaintiff to the effeet that a
divorce should be granted to alleviate an unhappy
situation where grounds of divorce do not exist.
Again the Court emphasized the principle of ~aw
by which the courts of Utah are to be guided in
divorce rna tters :
''The precept is well established that
the trial court is vested with broad equitable
powers in divorce matters and that its judgment will not be disturbed lightly, nor ~at all,
unless the evidence clearly preponderates
against his findings, or there has been a plain
abuse of discretion, where a manifeset injustice or inequity is wrought."
In summary, the medical testimony of Dr.
Brown showed that his counseling was inconclusive.
The plaintiff saw him under compulsion, fulfilling
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a promise to her son and refused to continue with
further consultations. According to the defendant's
testimony Dr. Brown informed him that he never
did get to the basic problem that was troubling the
plaintiff. Granted that most people involved in marital difficulties would be subject to emotional disturbance and tension; however, we submit that Dr.
Korner's testimony supports the defendant's contention that plaintiff's trouble resulted from emotional factors pre-dating her decision to obtain a
divorce. Her antagonism towards the defendant developed from imagined grievances, most of which
had their origin in innocuous things the defendant
did as part of everyday living which she interpreted
or characterized as affronts to her. For example,
in caring for the swimming pool and tleaning the
large house without help she exhibited a martyr
complex, that in her mind the defendant was responsible for these things which she did when in
fact had the matter been called to his attention he
would have been only too glad to see to it that she
had whatever household help she needed. One of
the common characteristics of people who ~are mentally disturbed is the development of a persecution
complex with a certain amount of satisfaction out
of the role of a martyr while at the same time complaining bitterly and blaming others, frequently
those who are nearest and dearest for what becomes
26
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subjectively a real problem even though imagined.
This conclusion is also supported by the testimony
of Dr. Nelson who said in essence that the neurotic
elements which at one time played a part in the
plaintiff's decision to terminate the miarriage were
reasonably modified by counseling from Dr. William
Brown and psychotherapy by him. It is significant
that he was not aware that Dr. Brown had suggested hypnosis in attempt to penetrate the '''barrier"
which plaintiff lrad raised 'against further discussion of her problem.
Because the plaintiff now seeks divorce, is the
defendant required to accede to her desire, when
from his point of view until three years ago the
marriage was ideal? Granted, there were the usual
problems that plague every successful professional
practioner dedicating a disproportionate amount of
time to his practice. In this instance the defendant
has had a broader perspective than most, for his
family has taken many trips and enjoyed other
numerous activities together. 'They were a close
family unit and they had 'a wonderful relationship.
Certainly he has not been penurious in providing
them with the comforts of life. The parties until
this marital difficulty arose worked as a partnership. All of his property, real and personal, is in
their joint names. Since their separation he has
voluntarily made funds available to satisfy her needs
27
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and furnished additional funds for trips she has
made in connection with her political activities. He
is fighting to maintain the unity of his family, and
who is to say that when this matter is withdrawn
from the trauma resulting from this litigation, that
the parties will not eventually reconcile their differences, as he fervently hopes. If he is earnest in
his opinion that the root of the trouble is an emotional change iadversely affecting the plaintiff which
will resolve itself with the passing of time, certainly
in contesting this divorce action he is doing no more
than should 'be expected of any devoted husband.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court
did not abuse his discretion in denying a divorce
to appellant. The evidence clearly supports the trial
court's finding that plaintiff failed to prove that
defendant was guilty of cruelty causing great mental distress.
Respectfully submitted,
HAN'S'ON, BALDWIN & ALLEN
By-------------------------------------------------------Attorneys for Respondents
515 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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